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LABOR LAW AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS* AND JAMES GILMER BOWMAN, JR.-
Labor Law is best defined, perhaps, as that body of law which
is directed toward, and peculiar to, the various incidents of the
employer-employee relationship, whether viewed individually or col-
lectively.' In this sense it includes all laws, such as those on work-
men's compensation, wages and hours and unemployment insurance,
setting forth the rights and limitations of the individual employee as
against the employer (directly or indirectly), as well as those con-
cerned with union organizational activity and collective bargaining.
PICKETING-STATE COURT JURISDICTION
Lodge Mfg. Co. v. Gilbert2 was the only appellate court decision dur-
ing the survey year dealing with the union organization phase of
Labor Law. The case involved the authority of a state court, at the
request of a manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce,
to enjoin picketing of its plant. The picketing, and the strike which it
accompanied, was designed to secure recognition for a union which
could not invoke the machinery of the National Labor Relations
Board because of non-compliance with certain filing requirements of
the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947.3
In the chancery court, the manufacturing company asked for an
injunction restraining all picketing or, in the alternative, that only
one picket be permitted at a time. The chancellor sustained the plea
of the defendants that exclusive jurisdiction over the practices com-
plained of was in the National Labor Relations Board under the Taft-
Hartley Act, but, nevertheless, continued the temporary injunction
previously granted pending appeal. The scope of this temporary in-
junction was not stated in the opinion. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Neil, agreed with the lower court that it
lacked jurisdiction to determine questions such as the qualification of
the union to act as a collective bargaining representative, the existence
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
t LL.B. Vanderbilt University, August, 1954; graduate student, Harvard Law
School, 1954-55.
1. See SMITH, LABOR LAw-CASES AND MATRALS iii (2d ed. 1953); cf. FoRK-
oscir, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 5-6 (1953).
2. 195 Tenn. 403, 260 S.W.2d 154 (1953).
3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (f), (g), (h) (1947). This inability to have the benefit
of Board procedures does not, under the terms of this statute, make it illegal
for an employer to recognize the non-complying union as a collective bargain-
ing agent for his employees.
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of unfair labor practices, and the legality of the strike. However, the
Taft-Hartley Act does not exclude all state court jurisdiction, the
opinion points out, and unlawful acts causing irreparable damage to
property, such as mass picketing, may be enjoined by such a court.
The court concludes therefore that, although it is a proper case where
peaceful picketing is permissible, the alternative prayer to limit the
pickets to one should have been granted.
4
The foregoing decision preceded that by the United States Supreme
Court in the much-discussed case of Garner v. Teamsters Union5 which
held that state courts may not enjoin peaceful picketing which
amounts to an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act. The
Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in the instant case, however, is
concerned with "mass picketing" and therefore falls within an area
of state power expressly recognized as lying outside the scope of
the Garner decision. 6 Recent emphasis has been given, furthermore,
to state power over mass picketing, threats of violence, obstructions
of streets and highways and picketing of homes in United Construction
Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,7 decided June 7, 1954.
While the Supreme Court of the United States has made it
abundantly clear that, regardless of the effect on interstate commerce,
the Taft-Hartley Act has not brought about any federal pre-emption
of regulation of mass picketing, the scope of this latter term has not
been clarified by that tribunal. It is doubtful in the extreme that it
would find acceptable a mechanical definition which, under all cir-
cumstances, would make the use of more than one picket the equiv-
alent of mass picketing. Nor should it be assumed that the Tennessee
Supreme Court has adopted a rule which divorces the concept of
"mass" from all the surrounding facts and circumstances. A balance
must be struck between freedom of communication and what is neces-
sary to maintain public order, including the prevention of violence,
actual or threatened. The opinion in the instant case does not make
too clear, however, which underlying facts led to the judgment that




Problems arising under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation
Law came before the Supreme Court in eighteen cases during the
4. Nashville Corp. v. United Steel Workers of America, CIO, 187 Tenn. 444,
215 S.W. 2d 818 (1948) had upheld an injunction which limited the number of
pickets and designated the areas where they might picket.
5. 346 U.S. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953); 7 VAND. L. REv. 422 (1954).
6. 346 U.S. 485, 488, 74 Sup. Ct. 161; cf. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 Sup. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed.
1154 (1942), and cases cited in Note, 7 VAim. L. REv. 422, 424 n.10 (1954).
7. 74 Sup. Ct. 833, 838 (1954).
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survey year. This volume of litigation before our highest court thirty-
five years after the enactment of the basic statute suggests that
questions in this area of the law may well continue to be of importance,
routinely, to virtually any practitioner. As is well known, the purpose
of such statutes was to provide a method of compensating an employee
or his dependents for a work-connected injury or death without. the
common law requirement of proving negligence attributable to the
employer and without the availability to the employer of the "unholy
trinity" of common law defenses, viz., contributory negligence, fel-
low-servant rule, and assumption of risk.8 On the other hand the
employer could be assured that recovery under such a statute would
be no more than a fixed amount and that normally it would reflect
loss of earning ability only rather than all the elements of damage
as at common law.9
Some of these distinctive features of Workmen's Compensation are
highlighted by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Thoni v. Hay-
born.10 A $35,000 judgment had been entered on a jury verdict by
the circuit court on behalf of an injured employee suffering thirty
percent permanent disability. The employer whose negligence had
caused the injury had elected not to operate under the Workmen's
Compensation Act,' thus depriving himself of the three common law
defenses 12 set forth above as against covered employees. In an opinion
by Judge Hickerson, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
The verdict was not considered to be excessive in light of the usual
rules applicable in personal injury cases including compensation for
physical pain and mental anguish. In contrast it may be noted that
the workmen's compensation statute sets an absolute maximum of
$850013 and the fractional disability in the Thoni case would have
been compensated at a much lower figure.
14
Two other Court of Appeals decisions, arising under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act 5, provide further contrast with the Ten-
nessee Workmen's Compensation Law.16 In each instance the ap-
pellate court affirmed the lower court's direction of a verdict for
the defendant railroad, because of the absence of proof of the neg-
8. Ri sENLD AND MAXWELL, MoDERN SoCIAL LEGISLATION 129 (1950); see
Cate, Workmen's Compensation--1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. Rsv. 1012
(1953).
9. TENN. COD AxN. § 6859 (Williams 1934); see New York Central R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917).
10. 260 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
11. TENN. CODE AN. § 6854 (Williams 1934).
12. Id. § 6862.
13. Id. § 6881.
14. Id. § 6878(c).
15. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1954).
16. Chaffin v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R., 259 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. App., M.S.
1953); Hawkins v. Clinchfield R.R., 266 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. App., E.S. 1953).
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ligence required under this statute. While one of these cases involved
a hernia which is subject to special provisions under the Tennessee
Workmen's Compensation Law,17 in the other the injured railroad
employee stepped on a nail hidden in the grass next to the track.
In this latter instance certainly there would have been little doubt
of the occurrence of an "injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment"'18 sufficient for the workmen's com-
pensation statute.
2. Covered Employment
Two workmen's compensation cases during the survey year raised
the question of the existence of the employment relationship. As
is generally true under labor legislation, an affirmative finding on this
point is normally a condition precedent for the application of the
statute. The only exception under the Tennessee statute is provided
by Code Section 6866, which imposes obligations upon the principal
and intermediate contractors for employees of the subcontractor. 0
While the common law master-servant test of the right to control
the physical performance of the work was applied in the two de-
cisions, one of the cases in particular shows how this "test" might be
better regarded as a short-hand expression for the conclusion drawn
after weighing a great many factors tending to indicate the nature
of the relationship.
20
In Weeks v. McConnel 21 the Supreme Court affirmed the finding
of the circuit judge that an injured paperhanger was the employee of
a house builder rather than an independent contractor. Under an
oral contract the paperhanger, using his own simple tools, was to be
paid by the roll. Nothing was said about control over the performance
of the work. The builder visited the job where the paper was being
hung one or more times a day but gave no directions regarding the
work. The builder thought the paperhanger was a subcontractor
and paid insurance on him under the mistaken impression that the
statute imposed a liability on him as principal contractor for an
uninsured working subcontractor.22 Both parties testified that the
builder had the power to terminate the relationship at any time.
Justice Tomlinson's opinion indicates that this latter fact was of the
greatest importance in the affirmance of the finding that the paper-
hanger was an employee.23 The court makes clear that it does not
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6892a (Williams Supp. 1952).
18. Id. § 6852 (d).
19. Cf. Weeks v. McConnell, 264 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1954).
20. Cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220, and see 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION § 43:53 (1952).
21. 264 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1954).
22. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6866 (Williams 1934).




consider the presumption of employment indulged in in certain
unskilled occupations to be applicable to a skilled trade such as
paperhanging.24 The holding is consistent with the general line of
authority throughout the country in making an unqualified right to
terminate the equivalent of the right of control.25
Still v. Penn. Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
26 pre-
sents another phase of the employment relationship question. In
this instance no right to control was found because of the absence
of a contract of hire between the deceased and the person upon whose
premises he was working when killed. The evidence showed a con-
tract between the operator of the Kingsport Machinists School and
the B. & S. Welding & Supply Company, a corporation, for "crane
service" at a stated rate per hour. The deceased, the general fore-
man of the corporation, was electrocuted on the school premises,
while giving directions to a fellow-employee of the corporation en-
gaged in operating a crane. The lower court held that the deceased
was excluded from coverage under the statute as a "casual employee"
of the school operator.2 7 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice,
Gailor, declared that there was error in holding deceased to be a
casual employee, but affirmed the judgment because he was the
employee of an independent contractor, the corporation. The fact
that the deceased's contract of hire was with the corporation, that
he received his compensation from it, is taken to be controlling as to
his status.
The court does not use the term but the case might well have
treated as raising the problem of special versus general employment,
the "borrowed employee."' ' The result is consistent with the general
line of authority in dealing with this problem. The special employer
becomes liable for workmen's compensation for the loaned employee
of the general employer only if there is an express or implied con-
tract of hire, the work being done is essentially that of the special em-
ployer, and the special employer has the right to control the details
of the work.
29
The provisions of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act are
made inapplicable to "any person whose employment at the time of
the injury is casual, that is, one who is not employed in the usual
course of trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer."
3 0
24. Compare Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d
323 (1950), with Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 465, 26
S.W.2d 148 (1930).
25. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 44:35.
26. 195 Tenn. 323, 259 S.W.2d 538 (1953).
27. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6856 (b) (Williams 1934).
28. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 48: 00.
29. Ibid.
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6856 (b) (Williams 1934).
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Normally the two clauses in this exclusion are not treated as equiv-
alent.31 This exclusion has been treated in Tennessee, however, as
being determined by the regularity of the type of activity in the par-
ticular business rather than the regularity of the employment itself.32
In both Rhyne v. Lunsford33 and Thoni v. Hayborn34 it was found that
employees were not "casual" who were engaged in the construction
of facilities to be used in the principal purpose of the business. These
holdings are in line with previous authority in Tennessee.35 In the
Rhyne case the employee of a lumber company was injured three
hours after starting to work. He had worked previously as a common
laborer for the company for a period of several months. After a
several weeks' lay-off he had been called back and assigned to dig-
ging a ditch in connection with the construction of a platform under
the supervision of the company's maintenance foreman. Justice Tom-
linson's opinion points out that other employees of the company
whose service had been continuous were working in the same ditchr
These facts were held to support a finding of regular employment.
In the Thoni case the employee operated a bulldozer used in the con-
struction of filling stations. Judge Hickerson's opinion states "the
business of the defendants was building service stations and selling
gasoline and oil through them," hence the injured employee's work
was in the regular course of business of the employer.36 In this case
a finding that the employment was casual would have taken the suit
completely outside of the workmen's compensation statute, instead
of depriving the employer, who had elected not to operate under it,
of his common law defenses.
3. Injury by Accident Arising Out of Employment
The theory of Workmen's Compensation has been summarized gen-
erally by the sanguinary slogan attributed to Lloyd George that:
"The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workingman." 37
Seemingly all have agreed that ". . . the blood of the workingman
was a cost of production, [and] that industry should bear the
charge."38 Implicit in such statements is the idea that there are
boundaries to the obligation. There must be an injury which is work-
31. See RmaSENFELD AmD MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 8 at pp. 192-93.
32. U.S. Rubber Products v. Cannon, 172 Tenn. 665, 113 S.W.2d 1184 (1938);
Dancy v. Abraham Bros. Packing Co., 171 Tenn. 311, 102 S.W.2d 526 (1937);
cf. 1 LARsoN, op cit. supra note 20 at § 51:12.
33. 263 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1953).
34. 260 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
35. Mashburn v. Ne-Hi Bottling Co., 191 Tenn. 135, 229 S.W.2d 520, 232
S.W.2d 11 (1950).
36. 260 S.W.2d 376, 378.
37. PROSSE, ToRTs 519 (1941).
38. Bausman, J. in Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n of Wash., 91 Wash. 588,
590, 158 Pac. 256, 258, Ann. Cas. 1918B 354 (1916).
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connected and by something more than mere coincidence. According
to the statute, compensation may be had in Tennessee if there is (1)
an injury by accident (2) arising out of and (3) in the course of the
employment.39 Once an injury by accident has been established, -the
question of its work-connection remains. "Arising out of" and "in the
course of" are but two facets of the unitary, not dual, test of work-
connection.
40
Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis41 was the only case during the sur-
vey year in which the question of injury by accident was the primary
issue. A truck driver died from a heart attack (coronary thrombosis)
while unloading his truck. The'trial court found that there was no
unusual effort involved. Therefore, the problem was to decide whether
a heart attack could be an injury by accident when there was no
unusual exertion. The court affirmed an award of compensation by
stating that: "It is now well established that ordinary and usual exer-
tion at work resulting in injuries, is compensable."42 This result was
not unexpected in view of earlier cases in the jurisdiction,43 and fol-
lows the liberal view of a majority of the courts that the "by accident"
requisite is satisfied either if the cause of the injury was of an acci-
dental nature or if the effect came as the unexpected result of routine
performance.44 Since "unexpectedness" is'the basic ingredient to be
considered, the majority is satisfied that the injury itself may be the
required accident. A substantial minority of courts rules that there
must be some unusual exertion in the "heart attack" and "breakage"
cases. 45 This probably stems from a fear that awards might be based
on harms having no true relation to employment, and the minority has
used "accident" as an arbitrary terminus. However, in view' of the
39. T=N. CoDE Axx. § 6852 (d) (Williams 1934).
40. For more detailed treatment of the test, see 1 LARSON, Wo xMEx's Cow-
PESAT N LAW §§ 6.00-36.00 (1952); 6 ScHNEmER, Wom-mmSrs CoAWErsFSATIoN
TExT §§ 1542-1543 (3d ed. 1948); 7 id. at §§ 1617-1693 (3d ed. 1950); HoRoviTz,
INju y AND DEATH UNDER WosMEN's CoMwENsAToN LAwS 72-182 (1944).
41. 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182 (1953).
42. 195 Tenn. 474, 478-79, 260 S.W.2d 182, 184 (1953).
43. Cunningham v. Hembree, 195 Tenn. 107, 257 S.W.2d 12 (1953); T. J.
Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235 S.W.2d 585 (1951); Milstead v.
Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610 (1948); Roehl v. Graw, 161 Tenn. 461,
32 S.W.2d 1049 (1930); King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 481, 296
S.W. 3, 53 A.I.R. 1096 (1927). But cf. Morrison v. Tennessee Consolidated Coal
Co., 162 Tenn. 523, 39 S.W.2d 272 (1931) (contracting tuberculosis from coal
dust in mine is not unexpected).
44. See, e.g., Central Surety Co. v. Industrial Commission, 84 Colo. 481,
271 Pac. 617 (1928); Bussey v. Globe Indemnity Co., 81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d
34 (1950); Brown's Case, 123 Me. 424, 123 Atl. 421, 60 A.L.R. 1293 (1924); 1
LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 38.00. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting
of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HAv. L. REv. 328, 337 et seq. (1912);
7 VmN. L. REv. 428 (1954).
45. See, e.g., Muff v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 35 N.W.2d 597 (1949); Cordray
v. Industrial Commission, 139 Ohio 173, 38 N.E.2d 1017 (1942); 4 ScEmEE, op.
cit. supra note 40 at 1240 (3d ed. 1945).
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basic idea behind the compensation concept, it would seem that an
award should be allowed if this effort (unusual or not) by this em-
ployee resulted in an unexpected injury impairing his earning ca-
pacity. In the instant case, once the court determined that an injury
by accident is possible without external accident or unusual exertion,
the result was a foregone conclusion, as there was medical testimony
that the usual effort of unloading the truck was a factor causally con-
tributing to the death.
"Injury by accident" and "arising out of" were not so neatly dis-
tinguished in Wilhart v. L. A. Warlick Construction Co. 46 where a
laborer succumbed to an attack of apoplexy. At the time of the attack,
he was carrying a small piece of rope immediately after having been
engaged in lifting lumber up to co-employees on a scaffold. The
medical evidence was that when apoplexy results from exertion, it
occurs during the exertion, not after. The doctors concluded that here
there was no exertion sufficient to cause apoplexy, and the court
•affirmed a judgment denying compensation.
Apparently the court was not satisfied simply to hold that there
was no injury by accident since it further concluded that there was no
manifest connection between the employment and the apoplexy, es-
sentially an "arising out of" problem. In fact, it is impossible to dis-
cover from the opinion whether the court bottoms the result on
"injury by accident" or "arising out of." It indicated that had there
been unusual exertion or strain at the time of the attack, compensation
might have been due. Though at first blush the opinion smacks of the
unusual exertion test,47 the court did not lose sight of the essential
problem involved. Certainly some effort connected with the employ-
ment, bearing a causal relation to the attack, would be necessary. Here
the risk was personal to the employee, and the mere fact that death
occurred at work was not enough, alone, to make it compensable. 48
The opinion illustrates how closely "accident" and "arising out of"
are intertwined in some types of cases. However, where there is an
injury by accident, it must be further shown that the injury arose out
of the employment. Ultimately, the issue resolves into a medico-legal
inquiry into causation, a nice demonstration of the tremendous in-
fluence of medical evidence. Therefore, perhaps the injury by acci-
dent test is not so important as the "arising out of" determination.
The court affirmed an overruling of defendant's demurrer in Work-
46. 195 Tenn. 344, 259 S.W.2d 655 (1953).
47. 1 LA soN, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 38:60.
48. Finch v. Evins Amusement Co., 80 Ga. App. 457, 56 S.E.2d 489 (1949);
Hahne & Co. v. Guenther, 114 N.J.L. 571, 178 Atl. 58 (1935); Ackerman v.
H. B. Wiggins Sons Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 519, 21 A.2d 628 (1941); Sandlie v. North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 70 N.D. 449, 295 N.W. 497 (1941).
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man v. General Shoe Corp.49 An employee had suffered a previous
injury in the plant for which no compensation had been sought. That
injury resulted in phlebitis, and, in the instant case, the phlebitis
caused a fall to a level floor. Because of the statute of limitations, the
later injury could not be related back to the earlier.50 However, the
court felt that if the employee could show some connection between
this fall and a hazard of the employment, compensation could be had.5 '
Courts are generally agreed that an idiopathic fall is compensable
if conditions of the employment increase the danger of the fall, such
as a fall from a height,52 near machinery,53 a sharp object5 4 and the
like.55 The controversial question is whether an idiopathic fall like
that in the instant case arises out of the employment. Some courts
have not sought to distinguish between falling from a low height and
falling while standing on a level floor and have allowed compensa-
tion,56 while others have not been able to find any employment hazard
in a simple fall.5 7 The rule of the instant case, that an idiopathic fall
to the floor is compensable if some hazard connected with the employ-
ment is proved, seems reasonable enough. It insists upon the require-
ment of causal connection with the work while indicating liberality in
its application. The difficulty will come in determining what sort of
hazard is sufficient to satisfy the requirement. It has been suggested
that factual distinctions based on the degree of hardness of the floor
are the only rational approach, 58 tenuous though the distinctions may
be, if any standard of work-connection is to be retained.
Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.5 9 involved a coal miner who died
as a result of thrombosis brought about by the spontaneous rupture of
49. 265 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1954).
50. But for the statute of limitations, recovery might well have been had.
See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 13:12.
51. No special fact connecting the employment with the injury was pleaded,
but this was not fatal. See section on Pleading and Evidence, infra, for a dis-
cussion of this aspect.
52. See, e.g., Baltimore Dry Docks & Ship Building Co. v. Webster, 139 Md.
606, 116 Atl. 842 (1922). Contra: Van Gorder v. Packard Motor Car Co., 195
Mich. 588, 162 N.W. 107 (1917).
53. See, e.g., Industrial Commission v. Nelson, 127 Ohio 41, 186 N.E. 735
(1933).
54. See, e.g. Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Co., 146 Tex. 413, 209 S.W.2d 333
(1948).
55. See I LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 12:12.
56. General Insurance ,Corp. v. Wickersham, 235 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951); cf. Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 Atl. 599 (1937).
57. See, e.g., Cinmino's Case, 251 Mass. 158, 146 N.E. 245 (1925); Riley v.
Oxford Paper Co., 103 A.2d 111 (Me. 1954); Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement
Corp., 253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506 (1930); Remington v. Louttit Laundry Co., 74
A.2d 442 (1950).
58. See the discussion of Pollock v. Studebaker Corp., 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind.
App. 1951), aff'd, 105 N.E.2d 513 (1952), in 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at
§ 12:14.
59. 264 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. 1953).
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an intercranial artery. His employer knew he had high blood pressure,
and the injury occurred during his first day on the job. He had to
walk in a stooped position, or crawl, from 500 to 800 feet to reach
the room where the coal was to be mined. Shortly after reaching the
room, he was found unconscious. Medical evidence showed that this
travel, combined with his high blood pressure, caused the injury
resulting in his death. The court, holding that the rule of the Patterson
case, treated above, controlled, reversed a judgment denying compen-
sation. The employer was held to have taken the man along with
his infirmity. The fact that, according to the medical evidence, the
unusual exertion aggravated an internal weakness was enough to
cause the injury to arise out of the employment.
The facts as found in the case would have justified recovery even
under the restrictive "peculiar risk doctrine" in that this walk was a
hazard peculiar to the employment and not one common to people in
general.60 The language in the Patterson Transfer case discussed above,
along with other precedents,61 indicates that the Tennessee court has
not looked with favor on the "peculiar risk doctrine." The court has
adopted the approach of reason by determining whether in fact there
is a connection between the employment and the injury, regardless of
whether the general public faces a similar hazard.
4. Injury in the Course of Employment
An injury is usually thought of as occurring "in the course of" em-
ployment when it takes place within the period of employment at a
place where the employee may be expected to be.62 The time and
place of the injury along with the activity engaged in are components
of the "course of employment" aspect of the work-connected injury
test of an employer's liability. Though the phrase "in the course of"
is taken from the law of master and servant, in workmen's compensa-
tion cases an employer's liability is more often caused by something
acting upon the employee rather than an act or an omission of an
act by the employee, which usually underlies the invoking of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. In this aspect of compensation cases,
attention is primarily directed toward deciding whether the employer's
interests are being carried out directly or indirectly, in view of the
nature of the employment environment, the characteristics of human
nature, and customs and practices obtaining in the particular em-
60. 1 LARsON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 9:20; 6 SCHNEDER, op. cit. supra note
40 at § 1543; HoRovrTz, op. cit. supra note 40 at 104 (1944).
61. T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235 S.W.2d 585 (1951);
Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610 (1948).
62. -1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 14:00; 6 ScHNE UE, op. cit. supra note




ployment situation. This aspect of the test is controlling primarily in
the "deviation cases" in which the employee is not actually at his
place of work or is on his way to or from an activity not an integral
part of the employment.63 Generally, compensation is allowed in
cases where the deviation is said to be for the personal comfort of
the employee in connection with the employment and where the
deviation is not such as to indicate an intent to abandon the employ-
ment relationship.64 Typical of cases within the personal comfort doc-
trine are those involving injuries while eating,6 drinking,66 smoking,67
and visiting rest rooms. 68
Less agreement is found in the cases involving deviations to carry
out personal errands during travel required by the employment.69
Where there is a deviation from the route for a personal errand, Ten-
nessee and the majority of the courts deny compensation for an injury
taking place before a return to the business route.70 The minority
allows compensation when the injury happens while the employee is
returning from the errand to his route.71 The difference, of course,
is based on what is regarded as a work-connected injury. The majority
feels that there is no connection with the work unless the injury takes
place on the route indicated by the business of the employer. The fact
that the employee is returning to a route in connection with his em-
ployer's business, and is therefore "in the course of" his employment,
is the rationale upon which the minority supports recovery for injuries
during the return to the route from a deviation.
63. For more comprehensive treatment of deviation cases, see 1 LARSoX,
op. cit. supra note 20 at § 19:00; 7 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 40 at §§ 1690-
1693 (3d ed. 1950); HoaovITz, WomvN's Co1WPENsATIoN LAWS 170 (1944).
64. 1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 20:00; 7 ScHNEDER, op. cit. supra
note 40 at § 1617 (3d ed. 1950); HosoviTz, WomVREN's CompENsAvioN LAWS
167 (1944).
65. Racine Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 600, 162 N.W.
664 (1917).
66. Menendes v. Dravo Const. Co., 109 Pa. Super. 224, 167 Atl. 423 (1933).
But cf. Callaghan v. Brown, 218 Minn. 440, 16 N.W.2d 317 (1944).
67. Bradford's Case, 319 Mass. 621, 67 N.E.2d 149 (1946).
68. Steel Sales Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 435, 127 N.E. 69&
(1920); cf. Tennessee Chemical Co. v. Smith, 145 Tenn. 532, 238 S.W. 97 (1922).
69. See note 63 supra; Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E.
181 (1929), opinion by Cardozo, C. J., is the leading case on the "dual purpose
doctrine," which provides compensation for an employee injured in traveling
on a combination of business and a personal errand if the necessity for travel
would still have been present had the personal aspect of the trip been
eliminated.
70. Even though the trip is a business trip under the dual purpose doctrine,
supra note 69, a deviation from the route to transact personal business may
not be compensable. Inland Gas Corp. v. Frazier, 246 Ky. 432, 55 S.W.2d 26
(1932); Erickson v. Erickson & Co., 212 Minn. 119, 2 N.W.2d 824 (1942); Hill
v. Dept. of Labor & Industry, 173 Wash. 575, 24 P.2d 95 (1933) (compensation
denied when motorman was returning to street car after mailing letter); 1
LAnsON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 19:00.
71. See, e.g., Macon Dairies v. Duhart, 69 Ga. App. 91, 24 S.E.2d 732 (1943);
1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 19:35.
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The case of Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Dedmnon 2 illus-
trates the strictness of the rule as applied by the Tennessee court in
deviation cases. A lumber inspector, required to visit lumber yards in
various towns, for a trade association, was on his way from one such
lumber yard to a hotel on the same street, where he was expected to
complete reports concerning the business, when he stopped his car
and crossed the street to visit a store to discuss fishing equipment
(clearly a personal errand). While walking across the street to his
car after completing his errand, he was struck and killed by a passing
automobile. A recovery of compensation was reversed by the court
in an opinion by Justice Tomlinson. The deceased was held to have
been outside the course of his employment until he returned to the
point of his deviation because there was no relation between his
employment and his being in the street in an exposed condition at this
particular time and place. The entire trip from the point of deviation
from the business route because of a personal errand to the point of
return to the route is outside the scope of the employment.73 It should
be noted that the deviation rule has been applied with a vengeance
in this case in that the employee was in a street where his employ-
ment required him to be at the time of his injury and was headed in
the general direction of his hotel, an objective within the scope of
his employment. However, it is neither so severe nor so tenuous as
the decision in an earlier Tennessee case where compensation was
denied by dividing a straight-line route into segments because of a
personal errand to be accomplished along the route.7 4 The Tennessee
court feels that when the employee is injured in the process of tending
to strictly personal matters, he should bear the risk of injury rather
than his employer since there is no real connection between the injury
and the employment.
With the Dedmon precedent before it, the court recognized that
the reversal of an award of compensation in Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Sullivan75 was clearly indicated. A typewriter repairman was
sent to a school in Oklahoma City to learn new techniques of repair.
During his free time on Saturday evening, he was riding with a fellow
employee in the latter's car in search of a particular type of bird seed
for a female companion's bird and was killed while returning to the
hotel after purchase of the seed. The court, by holding that the injury
resulted from a voluntary act not accepted by or known to the em-
72. 264 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. 1954).
73. Cf. ".... the courts now generally recognize that human beings do not
run on tracks like trolley cars... ." 1 LARsoi, op. cit. supra note 20 at p. 292.
74. Free v. Indemnity Co. of North America, 177 Tenn. 287, 145 S.W.2d 1026
(1941). Criticized in 1 LAnsoN, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 19:23, as inconsistent
with the dual purpose doctrine.
75. 265 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn. 1954).
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ployer and outside the duties for which the employee was hired, ob-
viously felt that the discriminating tastes of the lady and not the
employer's business contributed to this employee's death. Again, as
in the Dedmon case, the employee was returning to the course of his
employment from a deviation but had not completed this objective.
5. Measure of Compensation
Greenville Cabinet Co. v. Ramsey,7 6 turned on the type of evidence
sufficient to determine loss of earning capacity. An employee had
sustained a compensable injury (hernia) and was re-employed by the
same employer at a higher wage than at the time of the injury. He was
discharged after the lower court trial. The medical testimony was that
there was a 50% permanent disability, and the court affirmed a judg-
ment awarding compensation for 50% permanent partial disability.
The trial court chose to accept the medical evidence rather than post-
injury earnings as indicative of capacity, and the Supreme Court held
that there was substantial evidence to support the award. The court
followed its usual rule in such cases,7 7 and the more usual rule else-
where,78 that post-injury earnings, while persuasive, are not necessarily
conclusive of earning capacity. The interesting feature of the case is
that, though there was a seeming conflict between actual earnings and
medical prognostications, the latter were followed. This particular
evidentiary situation distinguishes the case from previous ones in the
jurisdiction,7 9 though the same rule is followed in all.
It should be noted, in this connection, that the last paragraph of
Code Section 6878 (c),80 which controlled the instant case, was changed
by the 1953 legislature.81 However, it does not seem that the new
wording would affect the result of the case or the rule that it an-
nounces.
The sole question for determination in McCracken v. Rhyne82 was
76. 195 Tenn. 409, 260 S.W.2d 157 (1953).
77. "The question is whether, in the open labor market, in his disabled
condition, the employee, after the injury, is able to earn in spite of his dis-
ability, as much as he was able to earn before the injury." 195 Tenn. 414.
"Obviously, evidence that at the time of the hearing below, the employee is
earning wages, is evidence that he has capacity to earn them, but it is not
conclusive evidence." Id. at 160. Crane Enamel Co. v. Jamison, 188 Tenn.
211, 217 S.W.2d 945 (1949); Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Sloan, 180 Tenn.
220, 173 S.W.2d 436, 149 A.L.R. 407 (1943) ; Sanders v. Blue Ridge Glass Corp.,
161 Tenn. 535, 33 S.W.2d 84 (1930); Russell v. Big Mountain Collieries, 156
Tenn. 193, 299 S.W. 798 (1927).
78. Agricola Furnace Co. v. Smity, 239 Ala. 488, 195 So. 743 (1940); Voight
v. Industrial Com., 297 Ill. 109, 130 N.E. 470 (1921); McGhee v. Sinclair Re-
fining Co., 146 Kan. 653, 73 P.2d 39, 118 A.L.R. 725 (1937); Industrial Com-
mission v. Royer, 122 Ohio St. 271, 171 N.E. 337 (1930); Haynes v. Ware
Shoals Mfg. Co., 198 S.C. 75, 15 S.E.2d 846 (1941).
79. See cases cited note 77 supra.
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6878 (c) (Williams 1934).
81. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 111.
82. 264 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1953).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the amount of compensation due for permanent partial disability en-
suing from a back injury. This required an interpretation of "wage
of the workman at the time of the injury" as formerly used in Sec-
tion 6878(c).83 The chancellor had construed it to mean "average
weekly wage," $32.22 in this case, but the court determined that the
legislature meant what it had said, i.e., wage at the time of the injury,
or $42.80 in the instant case. Instead of applying a single measure, re-
gardless of the varying language used in the statute, it is reasonable to
follow the literal language in each instance, the opinion declares, be-
cause policy may vary as between a schedule injury and permanent
disability.
The 1953 legislature amended the section to read "average weekly
wages" after the rights in the case had accrued. 4 Though because of
the statute of limitations the problem will probably not arise again,
the case suggests the general and generous approach of the court to
the problem of statutory construction in compensation cases. Gen-
erally, in a period of rising wages, the wage at the time of the injury
might tend to be higher than the average weekly wage, though this
would not follow in a period of recession. However, the court's ap-
plication of the statute further indicates its tendency to interpret the
compensation act so as to succor the employee,85 where possible, since
the act is avowedly designed for that purpose 6 with incidental ad-
vantages for an employer.87
Plumlee Revisited. An employee was awarded partial permanent
disability for the right hand by a lower court when he lost the use
of his little finger through a break at the proximal joint.88 The Supreme
Court found that the injury was uncomplicated in that it did not
extend to or affect the use of the hand to the extent found by the
chancellor and applied the statutory schedule for the loss of a
fourth finger.89
The case follows the usual rule90 in this and other 91 jurisdictions
83. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 6878(c) (Williams 1934).
84. See note 81 supra.
85. Giles County v. Rainey, 195 Tenn. 239, 258 S.W.2d 775 (1953); Plumlee v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Tenn. 497, 201 S.W.2d 664 (1947). See 9. Pleading
and Evidence, infra.
86. See supra p. 863.
87. Though shorn of his common law defenses, recoveries usually cost the
employer less than at common law. See, e.g., Thoni v. Hayborn, 260 S.W.2d
376 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
88. Adams Construction Co. v. Cantrell, 263 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1953).
89. "In all cases the permanent and total loss of the use of a member shall be
considered as equivalent to the loss of that member .... " TENN. CODE ANt.
§ 6878 (c) (Williams 1934).
90. Catlett v. Chattanooga Handle Co., 165 Tenn. 343, 55 S.W.2d 257 (1952);
Tennessee Products Co. v. Atterton, 182 Tenn. 110, 184 S.W.2d 371 (1945);
Crane Enamelware Co. v. Crawley, 180 Tenn. 272, 174 S.W.2d 458 (1943).
91. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Brown, 81 Ga. App. 790, 60 S.E.2d 245
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that when a member is lost and the injury does not spread so as to
affect other members, the scheduled compensation is exclusive, re-
gardless of the question of loss of earning capacity. However, if the
effects of loss of the member do spread to and interfere with other
parts of the body, compensation may be based on the extent of dis-
ability and not confined solely to the schedule for the loss of the
member alone.92 The Tennessee court's Plumlee doctrine93 seems to
go further than most courts do when the injury, though confined to
loss of the member without spreading damage, results in fact in total
disability. In such a case, the court allows compensation for total
permanent disability. This humanitarian doctrine has been severely
criticized9 as a destruction of schedule rates for loss of members,
something which should be left to the legislature, not the courts. The
doctrine is not universally disapproved, however. 95 The court indicated
that the facts in the instant case were not sufficient to take it out of
the more general rule and distinguished it from the Plumlee-type
cases.
Schedule awards for permanent partial disability represent a con-
clusive presumption by the legislature of the extent of impairment
of earning capacity in certain types of injuries. They are not, for
that reason, entirely consistent with the overall theory of workmen's
compensation, since the schedule provides compensation when in fact
there may be no loss of earning capacity or when the loss would
justify more compensation than the schedule provides. There is some
evidence that the court is out of sympathy with the theory underlying
the statutory schedule96 because it does not allow for the interplay
of reality. This judicial attitude may partially explain the develop-.
ment of the Plumlee doctrine, though it might not justify it.
6. Second-Injury Fund
A recovery of compensation for total permanent disability was af-
firmed in the case of Giles County v. Rainey9 7 when an employee who
(1950). Accord: Smith v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 399, 214 P.2d 797
(1950); Hiady v. Wolverine Bolt Co., 325 Mich. 23, 37 N.W.2d 576 (1949);
Lappimen v. Union Ore Co., 244 Minn. 395, 29 N.W.2d 8 (1947). See LARSON,
WomATE 4 s COmPENSATiON LAW § 58.20 (1952).
92. Russell v. Virginia Bridge and Iron Co., 172 Tenn. 268, 111 S.W.2d 1027
(1938); Central Surety and Insurance Corp. v. Court, 162 Tenn. 477,. 36 S.W.2d
907 (1931); Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470, 33 S.W.2d 90 (1930).
93. Plumlee v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Tenn. 497, 201 S.W.2d 664 (1947)
(total permanent disability for loss of use of leg as opposed to schedule loss
for permanent partial disability).
94. Kelly, The Demarcation of Disabilities under Tennessee Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws, 20 TENN. L. REv. 333, 345 et seq. (1948).
95. LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 58:20.
96. Johnson v. Anderson, 188 Tenn. 194, 217 S.W.2d 939 (1949), 21 TENN.
L. REv. 208 (1950); Standard Glass Co. v. Wallace, 189 Tenn. 213, 225 S.W.2d
35 (1949); Hix v. Cassetty, 186 Tenn. 343, 210 S.W.2d 481 (1948); Kingsport
Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470, 33 S.W.2d 90 (1930).
97. 195 Tenn. 239, 258 S.W.2d 775 (1953).
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had become industrially blind in his left eye as a small child had
subsequently become industrially blind in his right eye as the result
of a compensable accident. The employer's liability was limited to
the loss of the right eye, and the Second-Injury Fund was held ac-
countable for the difference between loss of use of an eye and total
permanent disability. This was a case of first impression under a
recent change in the wording of the section establishing the Fund.
As originally enacted, 98 the statute made an employer liable for a
previously sustained "injury," whereas the amendment changed the
wording so as to compensate for a previous "disability" and created
the Second-Injury Fund.99 Under the earlier wording, and in a case
with substantially similar facts, the court had held that recovery was
to be limited to compensation for the injury only, not for the effect of
the injury when combined with a previous handicap.10 0 "Disability,"
as currently used in the section, was held to cover the facts involved
in the instant case so as to allow recovery against the Second-Injury
Fund even though the previous impairment was not incurred in an em-
ployment situation.
Under the same wording in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act,101 the Supreme Court of the United States
reached an identical result. 0 2 The liberal interpretation of "disability"
by these courts would appear to be in complete harmony with the
Fund's raison d'etre.10 3 Its purpose is to prevent disabled individuals
who are seeking employment in the labor market from being penalized
because of the provisions of the compensation statute. This is accomp-
lished by making the Fund, not the employer, liable for the difference
in compensation between the latest injury and the total effect on the
employee's earning capacity. Once this result has been accepted, there
would seem no valid reason for a limitation based on the source of
the prior handicap since in any event the employee's earning capacity
is reduced to the same extent. The court recognized this in the instant
case. The rule of the case allows the Fund to further the ends of the
compensation act by providing more adequate protection to an em-
ployee with impaired earning capacity without unduly burdening the
immediate employer.
7. Dependency
The question of whether a posthumous child born of a marriage
98. Term. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 123, § 20; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6871 (Williams
1934).
99. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 149, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6871 (Williams Supp.
1952).
100. Catlett v. Chattanooga Handle Co., 165 Tenn. 343, 55 S.W.2d 257 (1932).
101. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 et. seq. (1927).
102. Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 69 Sup. Ct.
503, 93 L. Ed. 611 (1949).
103. 2 Lassor, op. cit. supra note 20 at §59:31.
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void ab initio is a legitimate heir and thereby a dependent under the
workmen's compensation act was involved in Winjteld v. Cargill,
Inc.10 4 A workman abandoned his wife and child. Without obtaining
a divorce, he then underwent a marriage ceremony (which, of course,
did not create a valid marriage) with a second woman who already had
an illegitimate child by another man. He continued to live with the
second woman, to whom his posthumous child was born.
The Supreme Court, through an opinion written by Justice Tomlin-
son, modified the chancellor's decree excluding the posthumous child
from participation in the compensation award. He was permitted to
share the award with the abandoned wife and child and the other
child of the pseudo-wife. The court held that by adding "annulment
or" to Code Section 8453105 in 1932, the legislature had effectively pre-
vented the legitimacy of a child of a marriage void ab initio from
being questioned. Since a legitimate posthumous child may be a
dependent'0 6 and share the compensation, it follows that one whose
legitimacy cannot be questioned should be able to recover also.1 07
The policy announced in the instant case, to say the least, does
not tend to discourage illegitimacy and illicit relationship-the wonted
custom of the common law in other fields-but it does take cognizance
of reality by recognizing that an illegitimate child can be as dependent
in fact as a legitimate one. It must be remembered, in this connection,
that the Workmen's Compensation Act is itself a departure from the
common law traditions. However, the tendency of the courts has been
to exclude an illegitimate when "child" or "children" has been used
in the acts because their common law term of art meaning would not
include such a person.10 8 When phrases such as "member of the
family" or "member of the household" have been used, courts have
found little difficulty in including illegitimates within the scope of
either phrase.0 q Some states have included them expressly by
statute.110 In tlhe case of Green v. Burch,"' the Kansas court inter-
preted "child" to include illegitimates and allowed benefits to a post-
humous illegitimate. Thus, though there is hesitation, the tendency
104. 264 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1954).
105. "The annulment or dissolution of the marriage shall not in any wise
affect the legitimacy of the children of the same." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8453
(Williams 1934).
106. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 180 Tenn. 191, 173 S.W.2d (1943).
107. An illegitimate child in fact dependent on the employee for support may
participate in the compensation. Portin v. Portin, 149 Tenn. 530, 261 S.W. 362
(1924).
108. Murrell v. Ind. Comm., 291 Ill. 334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920); Scott v. Inde-
pendent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 Atl. 117 (1919); Lopo v. Union Pacific Coal
Co., 53 Wyo. 143, 79 P.2d 465 (1938).
109. Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So. 842 (1945);
2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 62:23.
110. Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.085 (1946); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-2 (1943).
111. 164 Kan. 348, 189 P.2d 892 (1948).
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may be said to be to include illegitimates as dependents; and the Ten-
nessee court has again demonstrated its liberal approach in applying
the compensation act.
8. Statute of Limitations
The case of Taylor v. J. W. Carter Co.112 is notable solely for the
language used in applying the Act's one year limitation provisions. An
employee was injured on October 3, 1951, and did not bring suit until
October 15, 1952, twelve days after the end of the one year period.
He claimed to have been bedridden for three weeks after the injury
and that, under Code Section 6884 (4) 113 the one year period of limita-
tions was thereby tolled during his alleged incapacity. Justice Tom-
linson, in affirming a dismissal of the action on the merits, said that:
"The mere fact that Taylor was away from his work for three weeks Im-
mediately following, and because of, the injury is no evidence whatever
that he was physically unable to cause this suit to be instituted within the
remaining eleven months and one week of the year. He does not, there-
fore, bring this case within the protection of 6884(4).114 (Emphasis
added).
There can be little quarrel with the result reached under the facts
of the case.115 However, the reasoning used to support the result seems
inconsistent with the statutory provision extending the period of
limitations "for one year from the date when... incapacity ceases."110
Whether there is a period of incapacity after injury is the question. If
there is, then by the plain meaning of the section, the period runs for
one year from the date the incapacity ceases.117 Since there was no
incapacity in the instant case the exception was inapplicable; and the
suit was not brought within the period allowed. The supporting
reasoning is to be regarded, at best, as unnecessary. If applied lit-
erally in a case where there had been a period of incapacity, the
112. 264 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1954).
113. "In case of physical or mental incapacity, other than minority, of the
injured person or his dependents to perform or cause to be performed any act
required within the time in this section specified, the period of limitation in
any such case shall be extended for one year from the date when such incapac-
ity ceases." TEww. CODE ANN. § 6884 (4) (Williams 1934).
114. 264 S.W.2d 586, 587.
115. The court has previously announced that the period of limitations is
to be calculated from the time the injury occurs, or is discovered to be com-
pensable, as distinguished from the time of the accident. Burcham v. Carbide
& Chemical Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221 S.W.2d 888 (1949). This is in line with the
majority rule. 2 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 20 at § 78:41. However, when the
rule was propounded in Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206
S.W.2d 909 (1947), it was severely criticized as being a too liberal construction.
-20 TEm. L. RBv. 398 (1948).
116. See note 113 supra.




obvious result would make a common statutory provision of little
meaning. The passage in question may well have been not so much
an interpretation of the statute 18 as an expression of a reaction to the
facts of this case. One may question whether the court would wish
to stand by it in an appropriate case turning on this aspect of the
statute.
9. Pleading and Evidence
When it has been dealing with the sufficiency of pleadings, the court
has virtually traced the words of the statute ". . . to the end that the
objects and purposes of this chapter may be realized and attained."'1 9
In compensation cases, a variance between pleading and proof is not
necessarily fatal. Thus, when an employee pleaded a ruptured disc in
his spinal column and proved a sacroiliac strain, the court affirmed an
award of compensation. 2 0 All that is required is that the employer or
insurer be apprised of the nature of the claim in order to enable him
to meet it, particularly where the claim is of a type not included in
the statutory schedule.' 2 ' Even though a fact essential to recovery is
not formally pleaded, the complaint will be liberally construed so as
to uphold it, if possible, against a demurrer.22 The attention of the
court is directed to the substance of the case rather than to the form
of presenting it, so long as the defendant is warned of the general fact
situation with which he will be confronted.123 This judicial policy
closely approaches that of administrative agencies, where -informal
pleadings are usually customary.2
4
The importance of medical testimony was illustrated in many cases
during the survey year.12 Of necessity, courts in these cases must
rely heavily on the opinions of medical men in determining whether
there was an injury by accident and the extent of an employee's dis-
ability. Lay testimony is acceptable as proof of the extent of dis-
118. The incapacity need not be continuous from the time of the accident.
The limitation period may be tolled during incapacity originating at the date
of the injury, as distinguished from the date of the accident. McBrayer v.
Dixie Mercerizing Co., 176 Tenn. 560, 144 S.W.2d 764 (1940).
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6910 (Williams 1934).
120. Rhyne v. Lunsford, 263 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1953).
121. Workman v. General Shoe Corp., 265 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1954); Rhyne
v. Lunsford, 263 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1953).
122. Workman v. General Shoe Corp., 265 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1954) (demurrer
overruled though employee injured by fall induced by disease (risk personal
to the employee) and no special hazard of the employment was pleaded in
connection with the injury].
123. Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 194 Tenn. 467, 253 S.W.2d 552 (1952).
124. For more detailed treatment of the disposition of compensation claims
as administered before administrative bodies and courts, see 2 LARSON, op. cit.
supra note 20 at §§ 78:10 et seq.; HoRovrrz, WORxMIEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS,
382-94 (1944).
125. See, e.g., Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 264 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. 1953);
Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182; Wilhart v.
1,. A. Warlick Construction Co., 195 Tenn. 344, 259 S.W.2d 655 (1953).
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ability, but contradictory medical testimony will support a holding
which goes contra to the lay evidence. 2 6 Often, the medical testimony
is determinative of whether compensation is due an injured employee,
and, if so, how much.
The rule in Tennessee compensation cases is that the findings of fact
of the trial court will be sustained if supported by any material evi-
dence. 27 A refusal to reopen a case will not be treated on review as
an abuse of the trial court's discretion if the original determination
was supported by material evidence.12 In operation, the rule seems
comparable to the usual treatment of findings of administrative
agencies. There, the agency is required to draw its conclusions from
a preponderance of the evidence, and its findings of fact are not review-
able if supported by substantial evidence. 129 The Tennessee rule is in
line with the general rule in compensation cases that the finder of fact
will not be disputed on review if the facts as found are supported by
a residuum of competent evidence. 130
126. Davis v. General Electric Supply Corp., 264 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954).
127. See, e.g., Adams v. Looney, 265 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. 1954) (temporary
partial disability resulting from concussion and damage to sight and hearing
caused by falling limb); Davis v. General Electric Supply Corp., 264 S.W.2d
563 (Tenn. 1954) (material evidence to support finding that employee had
recovered from back injury by date compensation payments ceased); Wright
v. Gerst Brewing Co., 195 Tenn. 150, 258 S.W.2d 739 (1953) (material evidence
to support refusal to reopen an award for injury to leg).
128. Wright v. Gerst Brewing Co., 195 Tenn. 150, 258 S.W.2d 739 (1953).
129. See, e.g., 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 62 STAT. 991 (1948), 29
U.S.C.A. § 160 (c) (Supp. 1953); cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 71 Sup. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951).
130. 2 LASON, op. cit. supra note 20 at § 79:00 (1952).
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